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Abstract – Many techniques developed in simulations of physical models have been adopted in
studies of game theory by researchers including physicists and mathematicians. In this work,
we show that a seemly non-essential mechanism – what we refer to as a “payoff scheme” have a
large impact on strategic outcomes of some games. Payoff scheme refers to here that how each
player’s payoff is calculated in each round after the states of all of the players are determined.
Conventionally either the accumulated or the average payoff of a player is used, where its payoff
is calculated from pairing up the player with all of its neighboring players. Here we consider to
calculate the payoff from pairing up with only one random player from the neighboring players.
The average payoff scheme that involves averaging over all of the neighbors should, in a sense, be
equivalent to repeatedly randomly pairing up with one neighbor a time, which we refer to as the
stochastic payoff scheme. However, our simulation of games on graphs shows that, in many cases,
the two payoff schemes lead to qualitatively different levels of cooperation: Seemly non-essential
modifications might have large impact on behavioral outcomes. We have also observed that results
from the stochastic scheme are more robust than the average scheme: different updating rules and
initial states of the players do not have a large impact on the final level of cooperation in the
former case when compared with those in the latter case.
Introduction. – The emergence of cooperation has
been one of the central topics in game theory and its ap-
plication in social studies, human behavior and biology
[1, 2]. Understanding the relatively high level of coopera-
tion among inherently selfish players remains a challenge,
especially in situations in which there is a social dilemma,
where the theories of game predict defection but not co-
operation as the solution to the games (i.e., the theoret-
ically expected game outcome). However, it is well rec-
ognized that, in many social dilemmas, cooperation is ob-
served much more frequently than what the theories pre-
dict. Many natural and social scientists were inspired to
investigate possible mechanisms of the emergence of coop-
eration [3,4]. Thus far, it turns out that evolutionary game
theory [5–7] in well-mixed or heterogeneously localized (on
lattices or networks) populations provides the most gen-
eral theoretical framework for this line of investigation.
In evolutionary game theory, symmetric 2 × 2 games,
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift
Game (SG), have been used comprehensively as the un-
derlying social dilemma for studies of the evolution of co-
operation. A symmetric 2×2 game can be represented by
a payoff bi-matrix as
GC,D =
[
R,R S, T
T, S P, P
]
, (1)
where each of the two players has two strategies, Cooper-
ation (C) and Defection (D). Mutual cooperation yields
the reward R, mutual defection leads to the punishment
P , the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s pay-
off S, and the defector has the temptation T . To simplify,
the symmetric 2 × 2 game is usually rescaled such that
R > P , R = 1 , and P = 0. The different game situa-
tions are determined by different values of the parameters
S and T .
The well-known PD corresponds to the case of T > R >
P > S, where evolutionary game theory of a well-mixed
population predicts that mutual defection is a single stable
equilibrium. According to evolutionary game theory (also
Nash game theory), in this game, cooperative behaviors
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can only occur when there are some unexplored additional
mechanisms, such as heterogeneously localized interaction
among players. This approach has developed into so-called
spatial selection by Nowak and May [8,9] and others [10–
12]. It has been shown by their work and many follow-
up studies [13–16] that cooperation can occur in a certain
situation, depending on the following three major elements
[17,18]: the underlying 2× 2 games [19,20], the updating
rules of players’ strategic states [21–23] and topological
structures of the underlying interaction networks [8, 21,
24, 25]. A few investigations also mentioned the effects of
payoff schemes [26,27].
Here, payoff schemes refer to how a player’s payoff is
calculated after all of the players made strategic decisions.
When a player interacts with more than one neighbor, the
player’s payoff can not be directly determined by the orig-
inal one-shot payoff matrices GC,D. Conventionally, there
are two schemes: the accumulated payoff and the average
payoff. In both cases, in each round each player interacts
pair-wisely with all of its neighbors. Then, the accumu-
lated payoff of a certain player is computed by summing
the payoffs from all 2×2 games with each of its neighbors.
The average payoff is given by dividing the accumulated
payoff by the number of its neighbors.
Szolnoki et al. [26] studied the effects of a combination
of the schemes of the accumulated payoffs and average
payoffs. They introduced a probability parameter α to
combine the two schemes, with the probability α varying
from 0 to 1 to represent the transition from the accumu-
lated payoffs to the average payoffs. For PD on scale-
free networks, they showed that with an increasing value
of α, the fraction of cooperators, which is relatively high
due to the heterogeneous nature of the nodes of scale-free
networks, deteriorates continuously, eventually collapsing.
Noticing the drawbacks of the accumulated payoff and the
average payoff, being that the former allows a player with
a large degree to be extremely active, while the latter lev-
els out too much of the benefit of having a large degree,
Luthi et al. [27] proposed a modified payoff scheme with a
guaranteed minimum payoff. They showed that the mod-
ified payoff scheme still allows players with large degrees
to have a considerable amount of benefit.
Although those payoff schemes, including accumulated,
average, combination and the scheme modified by the
guaranteed minimum payoff, are all different from each
other, all of them are calculated over all of one’s neighbors
at each round. Thus, a player with k neighbors partici-
pates in k games at each round. This arrangement not
only causes the sets of the neighbors to be different for
each player but also makes the chance to act, thus the
degree of activeness, to be different for each player.
We argue that the spatial topological structure specifies
only who can interact with whom, i.e. the players who
are “reachable”. It does not necessarily imply that one
player is required to interact with all of its neighbors at
each round. Here, for simplicity of terminology, the latter
is referred to as “reached”. The number of reached play-
ers depends not only on the reachable players but also on
the activeness of the player who is reaching out. Noting
the difference between the reachable and reached play-
ers, here we propose a new payoff scheme, which we call
the “stochastic payoff scheme”. Every round, a reaching
player selects randomly one neighbor player from all of its
neighbors and interacts with it. The payoff of the reaching
player is calculated according to the original payoff matri-
ces of the 2 × 2 game GC,D. The payoff of the reached
player will have to be calculated when it becomes a reach-
ing player.
It is the major task of the current investigation to com-
pare the effect of this stochastic payoff against other payoff
schemes, here mainly the average scheme, on cooperative
behaviors. We argue that this randomly pairing up with
one of the reachable players at each round is more reason-
able than the alternative of reaching to all reachable play-
ers. Our consideration is that the attention or activeness
of each player is limited, and it is acceptable to assume
that this limitation is approximately the same for every
player regardless of whether it has a larger or smaller set
of reachable players. We also would like to note that this
setting does not require too much activeness of the players
that have large degrees; at the same time, it still allows
players with large degrees to have a reasonable amount of
advantage in both choosing from and observing the status
of a large number of players.
A similar distinction between the set of players to play
with and the set of players in observing status has been
noted in the literature. Ohtsuki et al. [28, 29] proposed
the idea of breaking the symmetry between sets of play-
ers during the stage of determining payoffs and updating
strategies. In a sense, what we are proposing is a way to
break the symmetry, also: one of the neighboring play-
ers is chosen in the first stage, and all of the neighboring
players are useful resources in updating one’s strategy.
There is another motivation of this investigation. Quite
often we see different results reported from games on
graphs that have very similar settings [17, 18]. The re-
sults reported range from the whole spectrum of signifi-
cant boosting, marginally effecting to seriously decreasing
the level of cooperation. For example, Nowak and May
[8, 9] found that for PD on a two-dimensional lattice, co-
operation can emerge and persist stably, while Hauert and
Doebeli [19] showed that for SG, the evolution of cooper-
ation is often inhabited. These results tell us that spatial
network structures do not necessarily facilitate the level
of cooperation. Santos and Pacheco [30] presented that
a scale-free network, because of its heterogeneous nature,
makes cooperation become the dominating trait, while Wu
et al. [23] found that when using the average payoff rather
than the accumulated payoff, the advantage of a scale-free
network is dismissed. Fu et al. [31] and Yang et al. [32] ob-
served that the optimal cooperation level exists for some
moderately heterogeneous cases, but not the most het-
erogeneous or the most homogeneous cases. Experimen-
tal results that are qualitatively different from theoretical
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prediction have also been reported. For example, Cassar
[33] discovered that for PD, cooperation was difficult to
reach on local, random and small-world networks. Grujic´
et al. [34] found that cooperation was not promoted by
the existence of a lattice in most cases. Similar results
were also yielded by Kirchkamp and Nagel [35]. The lat-
est experiments [36] show further that, when humans play
a PD, heterogeneous networks do not boost cooperation,
and they imply that for human beings, the spatial net-
work structure has little relevance to the cooperators’ pro-
motion or inhibition. In experiments, the payoff scheme
might be an issue that has a certain degree of importance
and, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been inves-
tigated extensively.
In all of those different reported results, there is cer-
tainly something different in the settings, but we do not
know which of the settings make the key difference that
is responsible for generating the difference and whether
it is possible that something that appears to be truly in-
significant makes the largest contribution to the different
observations. Here, we choose to question the effects of
the various payoff schemes: rather than allowing players
to play games with all of their neighbors and to obtain
average/accumulated payoffs, what if each player pairs up
with only one other player from its reachable neighbors
and receives payoff accordingly? On average, this modifi-
cation of the settings should result in nothing essential be-
cause, on average, pairing randomly with one other player
is very much like playing with all of the neighbors with
equal probability, thus seems to be equivalent to the av-
erage payoff scheme. On the other hand, it might not be
this simple given that there is neither an energy function
of the whole system as Hamiltonians for physical systems
nor a principle of detailed balance for game systems. In
simulation of Ising model, it is the overall Hamiltonian and
the detailed balance that guarantee different orders of up-
dating spins lead to the same stationary states. As will be
seen later, this apparent non-essential factor does have an
important impact on the observed behaviors. This finding
indicates that, in line with the work on games on graphs,
minor differences in settings can result in qualitatively dif-
ferent observations and when working on numerical studies
of games extra attentions should be payed due to the lack
of an overall energy function and the principle of detailed
balance.
This study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de-
scribe the evolutionary game model as well as five strategic
updating rules in detail. In Section 3, simulation results
are provided, and in Section 4, we summarize our main
observations and discuss their implications.
Model. – The models that are considered in this work
are the usual games on graphs, in which we have an un-
derlying network and one player on each node of the net-
work; each player has a set of strategies to choose from,
and then, after their strategic statuses are decided, the
payoffs to all of the players are calculated. This pro-
cedure is an iterative/evolutionary process: during the
next round, the players update their strategies accord-
ing to certain rules, and then, the payoffs are calculated
again. The game setup is based on general 2 × 2 games
that are defined by the payoff matrices GC,D. The net-
works that we considered here include the regular von
Neumann-neighbourhood [8, 17, 37] (Moore-neighborhood
[17, 37]) lattice with 4 (8) nearest neighbors for each
node(respectively), the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world
network [38] and the Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free net-
work [39, 40]. These four networks are denoted, respec-
tively, as networks n = 0, 1, 2, and 3. The payoff scheme
that we use is the stochastic payoff scheme (denoted as
payoff scheme p = 0). The results from this scheme will
be compared against those from the average payoff scheme
(which is denoted as the payoff scheme p = 1). Such a
comparison is performed on games that have various pay-
off matrices, on various networks and under various rules
of updating strategies. Those updating rules include imi-
tating the best [8,9], imitating the better with an exponen-
tial probability function [13,41], imitating the better with
a linear probability [17, 37], proportional update with an
exponential probability function [13, 41] and proportional
update with a linear probability [37]. These five updating
rules are denoted, respectively, as u = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
For convenience, we summarize here all of those updat-
ing rules by using the transition rates ω(si → sj) for which
player i adopts the strategy of neighbor j.
1. Imitate the best,
ω(si → sj) =
{
1
di
Ej = max {Ek |k ∈ Ni ∪ {i}}
0 others
,
(2)
where di is the number of equal maximum payoffs.
2. Imitate the better with an exponential probability,
ω(si → sj) = e
β·max(Ej−Ei,0)∑
k∈Ni e
β·max(Ek−Ei,0) . (3)
3. Imitate the better with a linear probability,
ω(si → sj) = max(Ej − Ei, 0)∑
k∈Ni max(Ek − Ei, 0)
. (4)
4. Proportional update with an exponential probability,
ω(si → sj) = e
β(Ej−M)∑
k∈Ni∪{i} e
β(Ek−M) . (5)
5. Proportional update with a linear probability,
ω(si → sj) = Ej −M∑
k∈Ni∪{i}(Ek −M)
. (6)
with Ei (respectively Ej) the payoff of a player i (respec-
tively j), β = 1 and M = min (T,R, S, P ).
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We have also performed simulations with synchronous
and asynchronous updating (which are denoted, respec-
tively, as s = 1 and s = 0). The results from asynchronous
updating are not reported in the main text but are re-
ported in the supporting materials [42], because the re-
sults are not very different from the results reported here
on synchronous updating.
Results. – All of the networks are of the size N =
51 × 51 in our simulations. The average degree 〈k〉 of
the two lattices, the von Neumann neighborhood and the
Moore neighborhood, are 4 and 8, respectively. The WS
model is generated from a 51 × 51 square lattice with an
average degree of 〈k〉 = 4 and a rewiring probability of
q = 0.2. In the BA model, we set the parameter m = 2,
which denotes the number of edges of a new node that
is added to the already present networks. The relation
between the parameter m and the average degree is 〈k〉 =
2m [40]; thus, the average degree 〈k〉 of the BA model is
also 4.
Each player can be either a cooperator or a defector,
and their initial strategic status is determined randomly
according to a fraction of the cooperators f0. Two values
of f0, 0.2 and 0.8 (denoted respectively as initial condi-
tion i = 0 and i = 1), are used in our simulation. Here,
we allow these two free variables S and T to take on ar-
bitrary values from [−5, 5] with an interval of 0.2. For a
given setup with a fixed S, T , f0, network, updating rule
and payoff scheme, after the simulation is stabilized long
enough (after L rounds of evolution), we record the final
fraction of cooperators from averaging over a period of
time ∆L. The same simulation is repeated N times, and
the final fraction of cooperators of the game under the
given configuration is then calculated from the average of
all N trajectories. We then plot the value of this fraction
on the square coordinates of S and T . We call this plot a
phase diagram. Different games under different configura-
tions require different values of L and N ; we present such
details in the supporting materials [42].
Here, we first show several examples of the phase dia-
grams, which show certain typical features of our obser-
vations. A comparison of all of these phase diagrams will
be discussed later, while all of our other phase diagrams
are provided in the supporting materials [42]. In Fig.1,
we plot the phase diagram, which shows fc as a function
of S and T with a synchronous updating rule, mimick-
ing the best, on a von-Neumann neighborhood, and using
the initial fractions of cooperators f0 = 0.2 and f0 = 0.8.
Fig.1(a) and Fig.1(c) have been reported on elsewhere [37].
We have regenerated and confirmed the results from our
own simulations. Fig.1(b) and Fig.1(d) show the results
from using a stochastic payoff scheme.
As can be clearly seen, the equilibrium cooperation lev-
els are notably different between the average payoff scheme
and the stochastic payoff scheme. In fact, when comparing
between the payoff schemes, the stochastic payoff scheme
appears to facilitate more cooperation regardless of the
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Fig. 1: Phase diagrams for synchronous updating, imitating
the best on a von-Neumann-neighborhood lattice. (a) Average
Payoff, f0 = 0.2, (b) Stochastic Payoff, f0 = 0.2, (c) Average
Payoff, f0 = 0.8, and (d) Stochastic Payoff, f0 = 0.8. The
colors changing from blue to red correspond to the levels of
cooperation from 1 to 0.
initial cooperative fraction. This observation holds espe-
cially in the area defined by S < 0, T < 1. Fig. 1 also
shows that when a stochastic payoff scheme is used, the
level of cooperation is the same for the different initial
conditions f0 = 0.2 (Fig. 1(b)) and f0 = 0.8 (Fig.1(d)),
while in the case of an average payoff scheme, different
initial conditions lead to qualitatively different levels of
cooperation.
To provide another example, we also plot here in Fig.
2 the corresponding phase diagrams for synchronous up-
dating, imitating the better with a linear probability on a
von-Neumann-neighborhood lattice. Qualitatively, Fig. 2
demonstrates the same features of our observations that
the difference due to different payoff schemes is quite vis-
ible and the initial level of cooperation makes almost no
difference in the stochastic scheme while it does make a
difference in the average scheme, plus level of cooperation
is higher when the stochastic scheme other than the aver-
age scheme is used.
We have generated phase diagrams for all 80 different
settings, including 2 payoff schemes (denoted as p = 0, 1),
5 updating rules (denoted as u = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4), 4 net-
works (denoted as n = 0, 1, 2, and 3) and 2 initial condi-
tions (denoted as i = 0 and 1). A game with a specific
setting is denoted as gpuni = g40p+8u+2n+i, i.e., game No.
(40p+ 8u+ 2n+ i).
To demonstrate the two major observations that the
two payoff schemes lead to qualitatively different levels of
p-4
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Fig. 2: Phase diagrams for synchronous updating, imitating
the better linearly with a von-Neumann-neighborhood lattice.
All of the other configurations are the same as those in Fig. 1.
cooperation and behavior from a scholastic scheme that
is more robust, in the following we compare all of the 80
games to one another. A comparison of the entire 160
games, including both synchronous (denoted as s = 1)
and asynchronous (denoted as s = 0) updating, can be
found in the supporting materials [42].
In Fig. 3, we compare all 80 configurations. Each
point in the figure, dlm =
∑
i,j |fl(Si,Tj)−fm(Si,Tj)|
dmax
where
fl (Si, Tj) is the level of cooperation of game gl at pa-
rameter value Si, Tj , corresponds to the difference in the
level of cooperation between game gl and game gm. Here
dmax = max {dlm}. We can see that there is a visible
difference between the the first (stochastic scheme) and
the latter (average scheme) 40 games (the off-diagonal
part between the first and the latter 40 games). It is
also evident that the small differences among the games
with a stochastic scheme (the diagonal part of the first
40 games except games under the fifth updating rule —
Proportional update with a linear probability, which seem
to be slight different from results under other updating
rules. We do not have intuitive understanding of this dif-
ference.) demonstrate that they all have similar levels
of cooperation. Thus, the results from the games that
have stochastic schemes are robust with regard to all of
the other variables. At the same time, differences among
the latter 40 games (the diagonal part of the latter 40
games), which are under the average scheme, are much
larger. Thus, the results from the average scheme are not
as robust as the stochastic scheme. Additional results on
all phase diagrams on every one of the 160 combinations
of the parameters can be found in [42].
Fig. 3: Comparison of all 80 configurations. The first (latter)
40 games use the stochastic (average) payoff scheme. Major
observations are the following: (1) The diagonal part of the
first 40 games is relatively small; thus, all of the games (except
games under the fifth updating rule — Proportional update
with a linear probability) under the stochastic scheme have a
similar level of cooperation; (2) The diagonal part of the latter
40 games is relatively large; thus, the levels of cooperation are
not very similar among those games; (3) The difference between
the first and the latter 40 games (off-diagonal part) are clearly
larger than those among the first 40 games.
Conclusions and Discussions. – Here, we have
compared the stochastic scheme against the average
scheme. We found that although this modification seems
minor, our simulation shows qualitatively different levels
of cooperation from the two schemes with regard to all of
the other conditions of the games, including the underly-
ing networks, rules of updating, initial level of coopera-
tion and synchronous/asynchronous updating. This find-
ing appears to provide a possible explanation for the wide
spectrum of predicted behaviors from various theoretical
works in the literature: a seemingly non-essential modi-
fication of the mechanisms can lead to a large difference.
Furthermore, we observed that across initial conditions
and the underlying networks, the levels of cooperation are
more robust when the stochastic scheme is used than those
of the average scheme. This finding suggests that perhaps
in studies of games on graphs, rather than the average
scheme, the stochastic scheme should be used.
The stochastic scheme seems to be very similar with
the average scheme but it leads to quite different results:
Generally speaking the level of cooperation is higher when
the stochastic scheme other than the average is used. We
believe that this big difference due to minor modification
of payoff scheme is related to the fact that there is not
a well-defined energy of the whole system and there is
not a detailed balance principle for games systems. In
physical systems such as Ising model, there are overall
energy functions and the principle of detailed balance thus
p-5
Q. Zhang et al.
the order of choosing which spins to flip does not matter.
We also believe that the stochastic scheme makes bet-
ter sense in modeling a real-life game-playing experience.
Unless there is a central agency of mediators, the cost,
in terms of attention or resources, of a player interacting
with all of its neighbors at each round of a game, increases
with the number of neighboring players. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that, in each round, the player will
reach to only one or a few reachable players, but not to
all of its neighbors.
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Appendix. – Here we provide further details on our
simulation and also include all the generated figures for
the whole 160 cases of values of the parameters.
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Further details on the implementation of our simulation.
Besides the underlying 2× 2 payoff matrices, which are
determined by S and T because R = 1, P = 0, a game
that is fully described by the configuration psuni. puni
has been discussed in the main text. Here, the additional
s represents synchronized (s = 1) or asynchronous (s =
0) updating. Then, the whole 160 games are ordered as
gpsuni = g80p+40(s−1)+8u+2n+i.
Given the game’s configuration, we are interested in the
equilibrium frequency of cooperation, fc, as a function of
the parameters S and T . In our simulation, fc is ob-
tained by averaging over the last 300 iterations of the en-
tire 10000 iterations, which we will show in the following is
long enough to reach equilibrium. For each setup, includ-
ing the specified values of psuni and S, T , in the case of
the WS networks and the BA networks, we run the simu-
lation on 20 different network realizations. Given all of the
setup and network structures, we perform 30 runs for each
realization using different initial conditions, however, with
the same initial level of cooperation. We have confirmed
that those chosen parameters are sufficiently large that av-
eraging over larger periods or more realizations does not
lead to noticeable changes in the value of fc. For exam-
ple, in Fig. 4, we plot the time evolution of one game
with a specified setup of psuni = (0, 0, 0, 2, 0), S = −4.0
and T = 1.0 on a single realization of the WS network.
We can see that, long before 10000 iterations, it already
reaches equilibrium. Other choices of parameters for our
simulation have been similarly tested.
We have also tested effects of finite size. Here we set the
total number of players on every graph to be N = 2601 =
51 × 51. We have compared the level of cooperation to
larger networks such as N = 80 × 80 and N = 100 × 100
and we found no visiable difference. The parameter N =
2601 = 51 × 51 is used in [37]. Other simulations [43–45]
usually user smaller number of players.
Fig. 4: For a game with a given setup of psuni = (0, 0, 0, 2, 0),
which means that it has a WS network, asynchronous updating,
a stochastic payoff scheme, imitating the best, f0 = 0.2, with
S = −4.0 and T = 1.0, over one realization of the WS network,
we run the simulation long enough to obtain fc, the equilibrium
level of cooperation.
Next, we report all of the results on the equilibrium
levels of cooperation of each of the 160 configurations. To
make all of the figures have the same dimension and, thus,
be easier for human eyes, we also include those two that
have already been covered in the main text.
Phase diagrams for all 80 games with synchronized up-
dating. Let us start first from the synchronized updated
games.
Fig. 5: Phase diagrams for games with synchronized updat-
ing and imitating the best. Different rows from top to bottom
correspond to different networks: von-Neumann-neighborhood
lattice, Moore-neighborhood lattice, Watts-Strogatz small-
world and BA scale-free networks. Different columns from left
to right refer to the following: (1) Average Payoff, f0 = 0.2,
(2) Stochastic Payoff, f0 = 0.2, (3) Average Payoff, f0 = 0.8,
and (4) Stochastic Payoff, f0 = 0.8. The colors changing from
blue to red correspond to the levels of cooperation from 1 to 0.
From Fig. 5, we find that the first results from the
stochastic scheme are obviously different from those from
the average scheme, and the second network structures
and initial conditions do not have much influence on
the levels of cooperation for games under the stochastic
scheme, while they do have visible impact on games under
the average scheme.
From Figs. 6 and 7, again we find that the results
from the stochastic scheme are obviously different from
those from the average scheme. For the games under the
stochastic scheme, both the network structure and the ini-
tial conditions do not have much influence on the levels of
cooperation. For games under the average scheme, differ-
ent initial conditions lead to visible differences, while the
results are not very sensitive to different networks.
In Fig. 8, again we find that the results from the
stochastic scheme are obviously different from those from
the average scheme. On the robustness of the results from
the stochastic scheme, Fig. 8 is slightly different from the
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Fig. 6: Phase diagrams for synchronized updating and imitat-
ing the better exponentially. The same orders and parameters
are used as in Fig.5.
previous 3 figures in that on the WS and BA networks, the
initial conditions (f0 = 0.2 and f0 = 0.8) result in notice-
ably different levels of cooperation. Except for these two
cases, all of the other games have similar phase diagrams.
Fig. 9 is special in that results from the stochastic
scheme are not very different from those from the aver-
age scheme, except in the case of BA networks. All of the
phase diagrams with this setup are more or less similar,
and thus, are still robust, while the phase diagrams are
visibly different from all of the other cases in the previ-
ous 4 figures. We are not yet clear why different results
emerge from these two very similar rules (the proportional
update rule with exponential probability in this figure and
the proportional update rule with a linear probability in
Fig. 8).
Phase diagrams for all 80 games with asynchronous up-
dating. Next, we provide phase diagrams for all of the
asynchronously updated games.
In Fig. 10, again we find that results from the stochastic
scheme are obviously different from those from the aver-
age scheme. Additionally, the results from the stochas-
tic scheme are more robust then those from the average
scheme. Furthermore, if we compare this figure with Fig.
5, then we can see that levels of cooperation from those
asynchronous games are similar to those from synchro-
nized games. This similarity between synchronized games
and asynchronous games is valid for all of the cases of our
simulation. Next, we will simply list all of the figures on
asynchronous games, and the observations from the fig-
Fig. 7: Phase diagrams for synchronized updating and imitat-
ing the better with a linear probability. The same orders and
parameters are used as in Fig.5.
ures will be the same as the figures on the corresponding
synchronized games.
Comparison of the 160 games. Similar to Fig. 3 in
the main text, in Fig. 15 we provide a comparison among
all 160 games. The order of the games has been defined
as l = g80p+40(s−1)+8u+2n+i for a game that is specified
by psuni, and point dlm corresponds to the difference in
the level of cooperation between game gl and game gm.
We can see that there is a visible difference between the
first (stochastic scheme) and the latter (average) 80 games
(the off diagonal part between the first and the latter 80
games). It is also evident that, except for the games with
proportional update with a linear probability, the differ-
ence among the games with the stochastic scheme (the
diagonal part of the first 80 games) demonstrates similar
levels of cooperation. Thus, the results from the games
that have stochastic schemes are robust with regard to all
of the other variables. At the same time, the differences
among the latter 80 games (the diagonal part of the latter
80 games), which are under the average scheme, are much
larger. Thus, the results for the average scheme are not
as robust as for the stochastic scheme.
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Fig. 8: Phase-plane diagrams for synchronized updating and
proportional update rules with exponential probabilities. The
same orders and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
Fig. 9: Phase diagrams for the synchronized update and pro-
portional update rule with a linear probability. The same or-
ders and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
Fig. 10: Phase diagrams for asynchronous updating and imi-
tating the best. The same orders and parameters are used as
in Fig.5.
Fig. 11: Phase diagrams for asynchronous updating and im-
itating the better with an exponential probability. The same
orders and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
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Fig. 12: Phase diagrams for asynchronous updating and im-
itating the better with a linear probability. The same orders
and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
Fig. 13: Phase-plane diagrams for asynchronous updating and
the proportional updating rule with an exponential probability.
The same orders and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
Fig. 14: Phase diagrams for the asynchronous update and
proportional update rule with a linear probability. The same
orders and parameters are used as in Fig.5.
Fig. 15: Comparison of all 160 configurations. The first (lat-
ter) 80 games use the stochastic (average) payoff scheme. Ma-
jor observations are the following: (1) The diagonal part of the
first 60 games is relatively small; thus, all of the games under
the stochastic scheme have similar levels of cooperation; (2)
The diagonal part of the latter 80 games are relatively large;
thus, the levels of cooperation are not very similar among those
games; (3) The difference between the first and the latter 80
games are clearly larger than those among the first 80 games.
Thus, the stochastic scheme leads to qualitatively different be-
havior compared with the results from the average scheme.
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